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THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 1965: TIME TO
REVISE OR REPEAL
BEVERLY HALL BURNSt
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONGRESS adopted the Service Contract Act of 1965 (the Act),'
with the laudable purpose of preventing the exploitation of the
"poorest" and "most marginal" workers in America: the service em-
ployees who performed such tasks as washing laundry, preparing and
serving meals, and doing the janitorial work for government facili-
ties.2 This purpose was to be realized by requiring that federal service
workers employed by independent federal contractors be paid a mini-
mum wage and provided certain minimum benefits determined by
the Secretary of Labor (the Secretary). 3 Eighteen years of adminis-
tration by the Department of Labor (Labor Department, or DOL)
and two congressional amendments have buried the Act's goals under
an avalanche of confusion and chaos. The protections of the Act
have been extended far beyond the imaginable scope of Congress'
original intent. For example, the Act today includes within its ambit
of protection not just "marginal" workers but some university re-
searchers and specialists in high technology industries as well. 4 The
Service Contract Act, a remedial statute aimed at fixing problems
that may never have existed, stands as a paradigm of good intentions
t Member, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Detroit, Michigan. B.A., Michi-
gan State University, 1967; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1979.
Research for this study was financed by a grant from the Carthage Foundation
to the Wharton School Industrial Research Unit, University of Pennsylvania, for
analysis of prevailing wage legislation.
1. Service Contract Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-286, 79 Stat. 1034 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1976)).
2. See Oversight Hearings on the Service Contract Act of 1965, As Amended, Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975) (statement of Robert J. Connerton, General Counsel, La-
borers' International Union of North America) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Oversight
Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 948, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965); S. REP. No. 798, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3737, 3737. For a
full discussion of the problems which have been faced in defining the scope of occu-
pations covered by the Act, see notes 55-67 and accompanying text infa.
3. Service Contract Act of 1965, § 2(a)(1)-(4) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§ 351(a)(1)-(4) (1976)). The Act provides for administration and enforcement by the
Secretary of Labor. Id. § 8(a) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 357(a)) (1976).
4. See Shlemon, The Service Contract Act-A Critical Review, 34 FED. B.J. 240, 242
(1975).
(435)
1
Burns: The Service Contract Act of 1965: Time to Revise or Repeal
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [
run amok. It has been justifiably maligned not only by the agencies
and private-sector employers whose compliance it requires, but also
by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement. 5
Revisions in administrative regulations, purportedly designed to
limit the Act's application and to clarify some of its many ambigui-
ties, have been greeted with the charge of legislation by administra-
tive fiat. 6 These revisions, stalled in administrative procedural
channels from 1981 until they became final in November, 1983, 7 re-
cently withstood challenge in AFL-CIO v. Donovan8 and were expected
to take effect following that decision. 9 A more complete resolution of
the problems-wholesale repeal of the Act- was suggested in Janu-
ary, 1983, by the General Accounting Office (GAO)10 and was reiter-
ated in November, 1983, by the President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control." The GAO contended that, although the new regula-
5. For discussions of agency attitudes toward the Act, see generally Service Con-
tract Act Amendments, 1972. Hearings on S 3827 and HR. 15376 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [herein-
after cited as 1972 Senate Hearings].
6. Oversight Hearings on the Service Contract Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Manage-
ment Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1981)
(statement of George J. Poulin, General Vice-President, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Oversight Hearings].
Mr. Poulin testified that the proposed regulations "would be tantamount to repeal,
by administrative fiat, of legislation duly enacted and twice reaffirmed and strength-
ened by the Congress of the United States." Id
Mr. Poulin was not the first person concerned with the DOL's attempts to re-
write legislation through regulations. See also 1975 Oversight Hearings, supra note 2, at
2 (remarks of Rep. Thompson). Representative Thompson, after stating that the
proposed regulations struck "at the very heart of the Service Contract Act," warned
the administration that "[t]he laws are not to be made under our system by the exec-
utive branch or changed by the executive branch or misinterpreted when the law is
clear." Id at 1-2.
7. For a discussion of the revised regulations, see notes 222-42 and accompany-
ing text infra.
8. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, Civ. Action No. 83-3608 (D.D.C. 1984), noted at 52
U.S.L.W. 242 (Feb. 14, 1984). For a discussion of this case, see note 224 mnfra.
9. See AFL-CIO v. Donovan, Civ. Action No. 83-3608 (D.D.C. 1984). The regu-
lations were originally scheduled to take effect December 27, 1983. The parties
agreed to postpone the effective date to January 27, 1984 in anticipation of the D.C.
District Court decision. The decision upholding the regulations was issued January
27, 1984. Id The AFL-CIO immediately filed an appeal. See AFL-CIO Appeals Dis-
trict Court Decision Upholding Service Contract Act Rules, [Current Developments] LAB. L.
REP. (BNA) No. 24, at A-11 to 12 (Feb. 6, 1984).
10. COMPTROLLER GEN'L OF THE U.S., THE CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER
REPEAL OF THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT 57 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT]. The GAO identified the principal problem as the
impracticability and expense of efficiently administering the Act to insure that "accu-
rate and equitable" wage determinations are made for all employees within the scope
of the Act. Id. at 57-58.
11. Repeal Federal Prevailing Wage Laws, Says Cast Control Survey, LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) No. 609, at 4-5 (1983).
Vol. 29: p. 435
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SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 1965
tions might correct some of the historic problems with coverage and
enforcement, regulatory action would not resolve many of the Act's
underlying problems.12 In response, Lane Kirkland, the President of
the AFL-CIO, called the GAO conclusion political, and argued that
congressional repeal would ignore the needs of the entire class of
workers whom Congress intended to protect when it adopted the
statute. 13
This Article attempts to bring into sharp focus the polar view-
points represented by the GAO recommendation and the AFL-CIO's
response to it, and to clarify the meaning of the statute itself and the
reasons behind its adoption. Primarily, this Article will analyze the
pragmatic and legal issues addressed in the limited litigation under
the Act and specify the potential impact of the Act's broad scope. In
conclusion, the Article suggests major congressional revision, if not
repeal, of the entire statute.
II. THE ACT
We were not thinking, you know, of all the ramifications
• . . [when we enacted the Service Contract Act]. We never
thought of all the different ways the thing would apply, so
we did not think of some of these problems--Congressman
James O'Hara, co-sponsor of the Act. 4
A. The Perceived Need
Contentions that employees of private contractors who provide
services to the federal government deserve some wage and benefit
protection were hardly new in 1965. Bills designed to confront the
same issue had been introduced earlier in the decade, and it was well
recognized that other employees of contractors who did work for the
federal government had enjoyed such wage protection for about
thirty years. 15 Specifically, in 1931, the Davis-Bacon Act set up a
statutory structure to require and enforce wage determinations on
12. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 58.
13. Id at App. XXII (letter from Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO to
Charles A. Bawsher, Controller General, GAO, Aug. 19, 1982).
14. Oversight Hearings on the Service Contracts Act of 1965 as Amended Before the Special
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 235-36
(1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Oversight Hearings].
15. See H.R. 1678, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 133 (1963); H.R. 6088,
88th Cong., Ist Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 7848 (1963). See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PROPRIETY OF MINIMUM WAGE DETERMINATIONS FOR CLERICAL AND
OTHER OFFICE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT 1-2 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as 1973 GAO REPORT].
1983-84]
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federal construction jobs exceeding a cost of $2,000.16 Then, in 1936,
the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (the Walsh-Healey Act) pro-
vided a minimum wage requirement for employees of manufacturing
and supply companies which did business with the federal govern-
ment on contracts in excess of $10,000.17
To some, therefore, a statute designed to protect federal service
employees would simply close the last gap in remedial labor legisla-
tion applicable to federal contractors."' Indeed, the federal govern-
ment has confessed responsibility for the fact that many service
employees were poorly paid prior to the Act's adoption.' 9 In 1975,
the House Committee on Education and Labor cited the requirement
that the government accept the bid of the lowest responsible bidder as
a major cause of the low pay of contract cleaning and other service
employees.20 In the labor-intensive service industry, the requirement
that the government accept the lowest responsible bidder was criti-
16. Pub. L. No. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C.
§§ 276a to 276a-5 (1969)).
For a good analysis of the Davis-Bacon Act, see A. THIEBLOT, THE DAVIS-BA-
CON ACT (1975); Goldfarb & Morrall, The Davis-Bacon Act.- An Appraisal of Recent Stud-
ies, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 191 (1981).
17. Pub. L. No. 74-846, Ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936) (codified as amended at 41
U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976)).
For a discussion of the Walsh-Healey Act, see H. MORTON, PUBLIC CONTRACTS
AND PRIVATE WAGES: EXPERIENCE UNDER THE WALSH-HEALEY ACT (1965). See
also C. CHRISTENSON & R. MYREN, WAGE POLICY UNDER THE WALSH-HEALEY
PUBLIC CONTRACTS ACT (1966).
The wage determination features of the Walsh-Healey Act have been inopera-
tive since 1964 when the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the Department of Labor could not rely on data collected by its Bureau of Labor
Statistics without revealing the sources for that data if the data was subject to im-
peaching evidence. Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Since the Bureau of Labor Statistics collected wage data under a pledge of secrecy,
this holding effectively terminated Walsh-Healey Act wage determinations. See
Amending the Service Contract Act of 1965. Hearngs on HR. 11884 Before the Special Sub-
comm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972)
(statement of Gregory J. Ahart, Director, Manpower and Welfare Division, General
Accounting Office) (hereinafter cited as 1972 House Hearings].
18. See 1981 Oversight Heartgs, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of John Sweeney,
International President, Service Employees International Union).
19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 2, at 2. See also Service Contract Act of
1965. Heang on HR. 10238 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965) (statement of Charles Donahue,
Solicitor of Labor) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings]. Mr. Donahue testified
that the Act would cover workers who "are among the most poorly paid and econom-
ically deprived in our society. Many are not covered by the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act or State minimum wage laws. Often they are not members of unions
and have little prospect of bettering their condition through collective bargaining."
Id
20. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 2, at 2.
[Vol. 29: p. 435
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SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 1965
cized as tolerance, if not actual encouragement, of "wage busting. '21
In addition, service contracts have generally been re-bid annually,22
increasing the existing downward wage pressures. It was this per-
ceived institutional exploitation of blue collar service workers that led
to the adoption of the Service Contract Act. 23
B. The Service Contract Act in its Original Form
The Service Contract Act was written in 1965 to apply to every
federal contract in excess of $2,500 if that contract's principal purpose
was to furnish services in the United States through the use of service
employees.24 The Act specifically exempted seven types of contracts:
1) construction contracts; 2) work required to be done in accord with
the Walsh-Healey Act; 3) certain contracts for the carriage of freight
or personnel where published tariff rates were in effect; 4) contracts
for furnishing broadcast services subject to the Communications Act
of 1934; 5) contracts for utility services; 6) employment contracts for
direct services to a federal agency by an individual or individuals (es-
21. Id at 2-3. The House report detailed how the government bidding process
encouraged low wages:
Since labor costs are the predominant factor in most service contracts, the
odds on making a successful low bid for a contract are heavily stacked in
favor of the contractor paying the lowest wage. Contractors who wish to
maintain an enlightened wage policy may find it almost impossible to com-
pete for Government service contracts with those who pay wages to their
employees at or below the subsistence level. When a Government contract
is awarded to a service contractor with low wage standards, the Govern-
ment is in effect subsidizing subminimum wages.
Id. The Act was passed in order to discourage these "wage-busters." See 1981 Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 6, at 24 (statement of George Poulin, General Vice-Presi-
dent, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
22. See 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1976). Section 11 provides that "[n]o contract . ..on
behalf of the United States shall be made, unless the same is authorized by law or is
under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment." Id. Since appropriations are
generally made for one-year periods, the contracts are usually let for one year. See
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, 92D CONG., IST SESS., THE PLIGHT OF SERVICE
WORKERS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 18 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter
cited as 1971 SPECIAL REPORT]. The constant re-letting of government contracts was
seen to accelerate the downward spiral of federal service wages. See 1965 House Hear-
ings, supra note 19, at 5 (statement of Charles Donahue, Solicitor of Labor). See also
1971 SPECIAL REPORT, supra, at 2. The special subcommittee found specifically that
the government's policy of one-year contract terms was "one of the principal causes
of the chaotic conditions in [the service] industry." Id
23. In this respect, the purpose behind the Act is not significantly different from
that of the Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey Acts: to protect the wage structure in the
private sector from the impact of the federal government's highly regulated procure-
ment process. For a discussion of the Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey Acts, see notes
11-16 and accompanying text supra.
24. Service Contract Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-286, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 1034
(1965) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1976)). The requirements of the
Act apply to stipulated bid specifications for contracts as well. Id.
1983-841
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sentially, consulting contracts); and 7) contracts for the operation of a
postal contract station.25
All service contracts covered by the original statute were re-
quired to contain the following: 1) a provision specifying the mone-
tary wages to be paid for each class of employees covered by the
particular contract; 2) a provision specifying the "fringe benefits" to
be paid to each class of employees;2 6 3) a provision that the contract
would be performed under safe and sanitary conditions; 27 4) an assur-
ance that the employees of the successful bidder would be notified of
the compensation required by the Act; 28 and 5) a provision that serv-
ice employees under contracts covered by the Act could not be paid
less than the minimum wage specified in the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 29 The Labor Department was charged with administration and
enforcement of the new statute and given significant latitude to make
"rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, tolerances, and
exemptions to and from any or all provisions of this [Act]." '30
The Act provided sanctions against contractors who violated the
Act's provisions. Specifically, violators were liable for underpayments
to employees 3 1 and the contract involved was subject to cancella-
tion. 32 Lists of violators were to be circulated and, unless the Secre-
tary recommended otherwise, violators would be barred from further
federal contracts for three years.33 Finally, the original statute pro-
25. Id § 7 (codified as amended as 41 U.S.C. § 356 (1976)).
26. Id § 2(a)(I)-(2) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1)-(2) (1976)).
The minimum wages to be paid were to be set by the Secretary of Labor (the Secre-
tary) "in accordance with prevailing rates for such employees in the locality." Id.
§2(a)(l). The Secretary was afforded limited discretion in determining benefits "pre-
vailing for such employees in the locality" which at a minimum shall include
medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death, compensation for
injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity, or insurance to pro-
vide any of the foregoing, unemployment benefits, life insurance, disability
and sickness insurance, accident insurance, vacation and holiday pay, costs
of apprenticeship or other similar programs and other bona fide fringe ben-
efits not otherwise required by Federal, State, or local law to be provided by
the contractor or subcontractor.
Id § 2(a)(2). The contractor, however, could elect to provide equivalent benefits or
to make "equivalent or differential payments in cash." Id
27. Id § 2(a)(3) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(3) (1976)).
28. Id § 2(a)(4) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(4) (1976)).
29. Id § 2(b)(1) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351(b)(1) (1976)). See Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
30. Service Contract Act of 1965, § 4(b) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§ 353(b) (1976)).
31. Id § 3(a) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1976)).
32. Id § 3(c) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1976)).
33. Id. § 5(a) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 354(a) (1976)).
[Vol. 29: p. 435
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SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 1965
vided for a right of action by the United States against a violating
contractor (or its surety or even a subcontractor) on behalf of un-
derpaid and unreimbursed service employees.
34
C. The 1972 Amendments
Within eight months of adoption, the Labor Department's Wage
and Hour Administration proposed to the Congress that some origi-
nal provisions of the Act be amended because they were already "un-
necessary and outdated. ' 35 Within a few years, supporters of the Act
were promoting amendments to compel the Labor Department to
make wage determinations36 and to eliminate what was seen as
"rapid turnover of government service contracts through underbid-
ding on wages and working conditions. . .. "37 Hearings in 1972 re-
vealed that the DOL had, in fact, failed to make wage determinations
in nearly two-thirds of all federal service contracts. 38 Additionally,
the House Special Labor Subcommittee found that a combination of
the government's continued practice of rebidding contracts each year
and the requirement of awarding contracts to the lowest bidder re-
sulted in frequent turnover of contracts. 39 In other words, whenever a
new bidder could minimize labor and benefit costs at a level below
the current contract holder, in the absence of a wage determination,
that new bidder would be awarded the contract.
40
34. Id § 5(b) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 354(b) (1976)).
35. Daily Labor Report (BNA), Sept. 26, 1966, at A-8 (quoting Clarence T.
Lundquist, Wage-Hour Administrator).
36. See 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 66 (statement of Charles Pillard,
President, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers).
37. Daily Labor Report (BNA), Aug. 2, 1972, at A-3. See also 1971 SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 22, at 18. The House special subcommittee, after blaming the
annual re-bidding process for causing chaos, explained as follows: "The pattern is for
a contractor to come in, establish a relationship with his employees, perform the
contract for a year, and then be underbid by another contractor when the agency
recompetes the contract." Id.
38. 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 6-7 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart,
Director, Manpower and Welfare Division, GAO). In fiscal year 1970, only 37% of
the notices of intention to award contracts were accompanied by DOL wage determi-
nations. Id In fiscal year 1971, the figure dropped to 35%. Id at 6.
39. Service Contracts Act of 1963. Hearings on HR. 1678 and HR. 6088 Before the
Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
46 (1964) (statement of David Sullivan, President, Building Service Employees Inter-
national Union).
40. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., lST
SESS., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HEARINGS: THE PLIGHT OF THE SERVICE
WORKER REVISITED 4 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as PLIGHT OF THE
SERVICE WORKER REVISITED]. In analyzing the problems with the administration
of the Act prior to the 1972 amendments, the subcommittee concluded,
A combination of the Department's failure to make wage and fringe
benefit determinations and its failure to recognize prospective increases in
1983-84]
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In 1972, Congress addressed these concerns. In amending the
Act, Congress 1) required successor contractors to pay service employ-
ees wages and fringe benefits at rates no lower than those to which the
predecessor contractor was committed by a collective bargaining
agreement (including future increases); 4' 2) allowed multi-year con-
tracts up to a maximum of five years; 42 3) required the Secretary to
consider federal wage board rates applicable to similar civil service
employment in determining the rates to be paid under a service con-
tract;43 and 4) mandated that the Secretary issue wage determina-
tions for all government service contracts subject to the Act "as soon
as . . .administratively feasible." '44
Clearly, it was hoped that by mandating wage determinations
and reducing the turnover on service contracts, the administration
wages and fringe benefits led to a situation where incumbent contractors
were turned out every year and new contractors refused to recognize ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements. Existing employees were forced to
take wage cuts if they wanted to keep their jobs.
Id
41. Act of October 9, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-473, § 3(c), 86 Stat. 789 (codified at
41 U.S.C. § 353(c) (1976)). The amendment provides an exception to the successor
requirement if the Secretary finds, after a hearing, that the predecessor's wage rates
were substantially at variance with those prevailing in the locality. Id.
The successor provision, which binds the successor to pay wages contracted by
the predecessor, conflicted with a 1972 Supreme Court decision which held that a
successor employer, although obligated under the National Labor Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act to bargain with the union certified as the representative of the predeces-
sor's employees, was not required to assume the obligations of the labor agreement
negotiated by the predecessor. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S.
272, 287 (1972). The Burns Court noted that the obligation to negotiate did not arise
from the existence of an agreement between the union and the contractor's predeces-
sor, but from the contractor's voluntary take-over of "a bargaining unit that was
largely intact and that had been certified within the [previous] year." Id At least
one governmental agency, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal, has held
that the reasoning of Bums applies to contracts covered by the Service Contract Act
and, thus, that successor contractors would not be bound to assume the obligations of
the predecessor. See Daily Labor Report (BNA), Aug. 31, 1972, at A-8 (citing Space
Engineering Inc., [1965-1972] 8 GOV'T CONT. REP. (CCH) 89,873 (Aug. 10, 1972)).
This agency felt that the Service Contract Act was so close in purpose to the federal
labor acts that the Bums analysis should control. See id. at A-9. For a discussion of
court decisions interpreting the Service Contract Act's successor provisions, see notes
87-104 and accompanying text infia.
42. Act of October 9, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-473, § 3(d), 86 Stat. 789 (codified at
41 U.S.C. § 353(d) (1976)).
43. Id § 2(a)(5) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(5) (1976)). The
federal wage board employees correspond generally to the "blue-collar" workers in
the private sector. See H.R. REP. No. 1251, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972). The sub-
committee was concerned with the "substantial disparity in wages and fringe benefits
[which] ha[d] developed between Federal wage board employees and their counter-
parts employed by service contractors." Id.
44. Act of October 9, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-473, § 5, 86 Stat. 790 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. § 358 (1976)). The amendment specified a minimum timeta-
ble for the completion of all wage determinations by the Secretary. Id.
[Vol. 29: p. 435
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SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 1965
and enforcement of the Service Contract Act would become manage-
able, efficient, and effective. Just as clearly, that was not to be. Even
through 1982, contracts continued to be let without requests for wage
determinations. 45 Moreover, the successor contractor provision of the
1972 amendments has been continually challenged for requiring a
new contractor-even one with its own labor force-to pay its work-
ers wages and benefits specified in a contract which neither the suc-
cessor contractor nor its employees negotiated.46
D. The 1976 Amendments
In 1976, it remained evident that the law continued to be subject
to ad hoc enforcement. Some issues which had arisen earlier remained
unresolved. For example, the wage determinations were still a major
problem. While the Labor Department seemed to have taken seri-
ously its legislatively-mandated responsibility to make wage determi-
nations,47 the procuring agencies were letting contracts without ever
notifying the DOL that the determinations were needed.48
45. GAO, ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE SERVICE
CONTRACT AcT 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT]. The
GAO reported that wage determinations were either not requested or not included in
381 of 980 contracts let by 20 agency procurement offices. Id. See also PLIGHT OF
THE SERVICE WORKER REVISITED, supra note 40, at 5. The House Special Subcom-
mittee pointed to the "effectiveness" of the 1972 amendments by noting that "44.5%
of service contracts were covered by wage determinations during fiscal year 1973, and
53% were covered by the end of fiscal year 1974." Id While certainly an improve-
ment over the 37% and 35% figures of fiscal years 1970 and 1971, respectively, the
fact remained that nearly half of all relevant contracts were not covered by such
determinations.
Moreover, those determinations which were made were not required to meet the
federal wage board rates for the corresponding jobs. See American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Donovan, 93 LAB. CAS. (CCH) 34,177 (D.D.C. 1982). In that case,
the court recognized that Congress sought to close the gap between wage board em-
ployees and their private sector counterparts. It reasoned that Congress could easily
have made such a provision expressly mandatory if it had so desired. Id at 44,502-
03. Thus, the court concluded that Congress intended to give the Secretary the dis-
cretion to allow a justified disparity. Id. at 44,503.
46. See 1972 Senate Hearings,supra note 5, at 19-20 (statement of Richard Grune-
wald, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards, DOL). Mr. Grunewald raises
the specter of outgoing contractors agreeing to wage increases to minimize labor un-
rest, since there is no competitive reason not to do so. Id
An additional result of the successorship provision has been that, out of a desire
to avoid having third parties dictate their contract terms, contractors may be discour-
aged from bidding on contracts. See Goldfarb & Heywood, An Economic Evaluation of
iht Service Contract Act, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 56, 62 (1982). The authors con-
tend that this development will lead to a "locking in" of contractors. Id. For a full
discussion of the implications of the successorship provision in the 1972 amendments,
see notes 88-107 and accompanying text infra.
47. For an illustration of the DOL's improved record in issuing wage determina-
tions, see note 45 supra.
48. For a discussion of this failure to request wage determinations, see note 45
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Moreover, by 1976, a new and troubling issue had arisen. Since
the enactment of the original statute, the Labor Department had vac-
illated on the question of whether clerical employees of service con-
tractors were to be covered and included in wage determinations. 49
This ambiguity remained despite the fact that the legislative history
of the Act provided strong evidence that clerical and other office em-
ployees were not intended to be included as service employees.5 0 In
1976, a Florida district court had, in fact, held that Congress intended
the Act to be limited in its coverage to blue-collar workers or "wage
board" job classifications as defined for the federal civil service. 51
Congress reacted to that decision by amending the statute to cover all
persons except bona fide executive, administrative, and professional
employees. 52 Nevertheless, just as the 1972 amendments had failed to
resolve problems (and in fact created their own), the definitional
supra. It should be noted that this problem continues today. See 1982 COMPLIANCE
ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 7.
49. See Shlemon, supra note 4, at 242-43. The author notes that despite indica-
tions in 1970 and 1971 from the Wage and Hour Division and the Labor Department
that clerical employees would be excluded from wage determinations, no regulations
were changed and wage determinations issued in 1972 included clerical employees.
Id
50. See 1973 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 1-2.
51. Federal Elec. Co. v. Dunlop, 419 F. Supp. 221, 225 (M.D. Fla. 1976). The
court was persuaded that the similarity between the language in the Act defining
"service employee" and the language of the Classification Act which defines the blue
collar "wage board" employees of the federal government was too striking to be coin-
cidental. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 5102(c)(7) (1982). The court also made reference to the
legislative history of the Act, which was replete with concern for the service worker
counterparts of federal blue collar workers. 419 F. Supp. at 225. For a further discus-
sion of Federal Electrzc, see notes 60-67 and accompanying text t'fra.
A federal district judge in Delaware faced the same issue and held that
keypunch operators were not service workers within the meaning of the Act.
Descomp, Inc. v. Sampson, 377 F. Supp. 254 (D. Del. 1974). For a further discussion
of Descomp as it relates to the definition of service employee, see notes 69-79 and
accompanying text ifra.
52. Act of October 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-489, § 3, 90 Stat. 2358 (codified at
41 U.S.C. § 357(b) (1976)). The amendment was endorsed by the Ford Administra-
tion. Its effect was to overturn federal court decisions limiting the scope of the Act.
See Federal Elec. Co. v. Dunlop, 419 F. Supp. 221, 226 (M.D. Fla. 1976). The court
recognized that Congress, subsequent to the 1972 amendment and the Descomp case,
has criticized the Descomp holding as unduly restrictive, and had agreed with the
government's more expansive reading which included white-collar employees. Id.
See PLIGHT OF THE SERVICE WORKER REVISITED, supra note 38, at 11-12. However,
the court limited its consideration of congressional intent to analyzing the contempo-
raneous legislative history of the Act as enacted and amended. 419 F. Supp. at 226.
In conclusion, it invited the Congress to further amendment by stating as follows:
"Congressional dissatisfaction with a Court's construction of an act must be ex-
pressed through subsequent legislation in order to change the law as indicated by the
statute enacted and its contemporaneous legislative history." 419 F. Supp. at 226.
With the passage of the 1976 amendments, Congress accepted the invitation.
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"clarification" in 1976 was to wreak its own kind of havoc.53
III. LEGAL ISSUES
Litigation over the statute has been limited, perhaps in part be-
cause of the erratic enforcement of the Act. 54 Moreover, what litiga-
tion there has been has produced a number of conflicting
interpretations of major provisions of the Act. Primarily, judicial re-
view of the statute has focused on five major issues of statutory inter-
pretation which are essential to evaluating the efficacy of the Act:
1) Who is a "service employee?"; 2) What is a "locality" for the pur-
poses of the statute?; 3) What is the extent of the "successorship" re-
quirement?; 4) When and to what extent can penalties be imposed?;
and 5) Who has standing to sue under the Act?
A. The Scope of the Term "Service Employee"
The question of what kinds of employees Congress intended to
include within the Act's protections generated greater controversy
prior to the adoption of the 1976 amendments. The statute as origi-
nally enacted defined a "service employee" essentially to be "any per-
son engaged in a recognized trade or craft . . . and any other
employee . . . in a position having trade, craft, or laboring experi-
ence as the paramount requirement. '55 While the 1976 amendments,
to a large extent, resolved discrepancies in the interpretation of this
language, 56 some discussion of the cases which interpreted the origi-
nal language is helpful in evaluating the Act's usefulness.
53. The most pressing problem is the applicability of the Act to highly skilled
"service" industries such as automated data processing (ADP). See COMPTROLLER
GEN'L OF THE U.S., SERVICE CONTRACT ACT SHOULD NOT APPLY TO SERVICE EM-
PLOYEES OF ADP AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 30 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as SCA, ADP AND HIGH-TECHNOLOGY]. For a discussion of the application of the
Act to skilled, high technology labor, see notes 190-203 and accompanying text infra.
54. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never heard a case relating to the Service
Contract Act. For a discussion of agency and Labor Department enforcement of the
Act, see notes 205-25 and accompanying text nfira.
55. Service Contract Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-286, § 8(b), 79 Stat. 1034, 1036
(codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 357(b) (1976)). The original act covered
guards, watchmen, and any person engaged in a recognized trade or craft,
or other skilled mechanical craft, or in unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled
manual labor occupations; and any other employee including a foreman or
supervisor in a position having trade, craft, or laboring experience as the
paramount requirement; and shall include all such persons regardless of
any contractual relationship that may be alleged to exist between a contrac-
tor or subcontractor and such persons.
Id
56. For a discussion of the 1976 amendments, see notes 45-51 and accompany-
ing text supra. Prior to the 1976 amendments, the DOL had included in its wage
determinations such diverse occupations as "marine engineers, priests, ministers, li-
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In two important cases, different courts held that the resolution
of this troublesome issue, essentially involving the scope of the Act's
protections, rested on a distinction between "blue-collar" and "white-
collar" workers. In Descomp, Inc. v. Sampson, a Delaware district court
found that keypunch operators were not service employees within the
meaning of the Act.5 7 In so finding, the court relied on the single
criterion of whether an employee's status would be classified as
"wage-board" or "general schedule" if the employee were employed
directly by the government. 58 The court found that a federal em-
ployee counterpart to the keypunch operators would be classified as
"general schedule"-a "white-collar" position. Consequently, the
court determined that Congress did not intend keypunch operators to
fall within the purview of the Act. 5
9
Similarly, in Federal Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, decided just prior to
the adoption of the 1976 amendments, a Florida district court also
held that keypunch operators and their supervisors were not covered
by the Act. 6° In Federal Electric, the parties had agreed that none of
the ten classifications involved would constitute "wage-board" or
"blue-collar" occupations. 6 1 Nonetheless, the Secretary argued that
despite their "white-collar" status, the Federal Electric employees and
others like them were deserving of the protection of the statute. 6
2 It
brarians, radio announcers, computer operators, draftsmen, stenographers, and other
clerical, technical and management personnel." Shlemon, supra note 4, at 242.
57. 377 F. Supp. 254, 264 (D. Del. 1974). The DOL had concluded that the
contract in question was one for "services" within the Act and, thus, had performed a
wage determination as required by the Act. Id at 256. The court agreed with the
DOL's position that a contract to provide keypunching was one for "services," but
held that the Act required a further finding that the contract in question was to be
performed "through the use of service employees." Id. at 257. The contractor had
argued that the contract was one primarily designed to provide materials, not serv-
ices. Id at 257.
58. Id at 263. The court noted that whether certain types of employees were
"service employees" was a "factual" issue requiring an agency determination in each
individual case. Id at 260. Thus, a reviewing court should generally defer to the
DOL's expertise, subject of course to the boundaries of congressional mandate. Id
See also Kentron Hawaii, Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59. Descomp, 377 F. Supp. at 263-64. In this regard, the court noted the Labor
Department's own regulations providing that "[t]he breadth of the definition [of
'service employees'...] . . .is identical with that in the Classification Act Amend-
ment of 1954 defining the so-called 'blue-collar workers' or 'wage board employees' in
the Federal service." Id at 262 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1082(7)) (1982) and quoting 29
C.F.R. § 4.113(b) (1968)). The court concluded that, as the DOL's determination
was in conflict with its own regulations, it had no "warrant in the record," nor a
"reasonable basis in law." Id at 264.
60. 419 F. Supp. 221, 226 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
61. Id at 223. The 10 classifications that were involved ranged from keypunch
operators to senior computer operators. Id The contractor sued for a declaratory
judgment of exemption from the Act's provisions. Id
62. Id at 223-24.
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was clear that the court was sympathetic to this argument, a sympa-
thy later echoed and magnified by Congress in adopting the 1976
amendments. However, the court rejected the Secretary's arguments,
stating, "While this court must accord due deference to the expertise
of the Secretary of Labor, this Court is also under a higher duty to
• . . [hold] when necessary, that the Secretary's determination has ex-
ceeded the boundaries set by Congress. '63 These boundaries, the
court found, incorporated only the "blue-collar" definition for service
employees. 64
Although the determination of what kinds of employees consti-
tute "service employees" continues to be a pragmatic problem, 65 liti-
gation over the question has not continued. The passage of the 1976
amendments legislatively overruled Descomp and Federal Electric, and
brought all employees of federal service contractors except those who
are bona fide executives, administrators, and professionals-under
the statute's umbrella. 66 Indeed, the "service employee" definition
question has been litigated only once since the passage of the amend-
ments; the court simply reiterated the broad language of the amend-
ments and found the employee, a truck driver under contract to
deliver mail, to be such a "service employee. '67
B. What Is A "Locality"?
The locality provision of the Act requires that service employees
working under government service contracts be paid "in accordance
with prevailing rates for such employees in the locah. ' ' 68 The question of
63. Id at 224.
64. Id. at 226. The court emphasized the similarity of the Act's language to the
Classification Act Amendments of 1954 defining blue-collar workers. Id at 225 (cit-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 5102(c)(7) (1982)). Essentially the same point was made in Descomp.
See note 59 supra. In Federal Electric, the court focused heavily on the legislative his-
tory of the Act and found no "evidence [of] a concern for those employees who would
fall within the 'white collar' classification." 419 F. Supp. at 225. The court conceded
that there had been some congressional dissatisfaction expressed in the wake of the
Descomp opinion. Id at 226. Nonetheless, the court felt compelled to consider only
the Act's original enactment and its contemporaneous legislative history. Id
65. See notes 190-203 and accompanying text infra.
66. For a discussion of the 1976 amendments in this regard, see notes 49-53 and
accompanying text supra.
67. Nichols v. Mower's News Serv., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Vt. 1980).
For a discussion of the potential implications of the broad scope of the 1976 amend-
ments, see notes 190-203 and accompanying text infra.
68. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added). The "fringe benefit" re-
quirement of the Act also contains a similar "locality" provision. Id § 351(a)(2).
The Senate report on the original Act stated that "[t]he Secretary in determining the
locality for such purpose would take a realistic view of the type of service contract
intended to be covered by the determination [of prevailing wages]." S. REP. No. 798,
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what constitutes the applicable "locality" was raised in the earliest
cases under the Act and has continued to be a troublesome issue.
Therefore, an analysis of the major decisions raising this issue is neces-
sary to an understanding of the practical problems still present under
the Act.
In Descomp, Inc. v. Sampson ,69 a bidder on a government keypunch
contract sued for a declaratory judgment that the "locality," for pur-
poses of a Labor Department wage determination, should be the loca-
tion of the contractor's principal place of business rather than the
location of the contracting federal agency. 70 The government pro-
posed four arguments in favor of the location of the contracting facil-
ity as the proper locality. Specifically, the government claimed that
the Act's use of the word "locality" in the singular suggests the loca-
tion of the contracting facility, since Congress must have known there
would be multiple bids from multiple localities. 71 Second, the govern-
ment argued that Congress could not have meant the locality of the
place of performance because it must have known that the Labor De-
partment would not have the manpower to perform wage determina-
tions for the location of every contract bidder.72  Third, the
government contended that Congress intended to give the Labor De-
partment great flexibility in determining the proper locality.7 3 Fi-
nally, the government argued that where a duty to act rests on
ambiguous terms, a court should defer to the agency's expertise.74
The district court rejected each of the government's contentions
and found that the place of performance was the proper "locality"
under the Act. 75 The court stated that it was "just as likely" that
Congress intended the place of performance rather than the location
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3737,
3738.
69. 377 F. Supp. 254 (D. Del. 1974).
70. Id. at 256-57. As already discussed, the district court found that keypunch
operators were not covered by the Act. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra.
Nonetheless, the court went on to determine the locality issue in dictum. 377 F.
Supp. at 264. The contract was to be performed at the contractor's place of business
at Wilmington, Delaware, while the contracting agency, the General Services Ad-
ministration, was located at Washington, D.C. Id at 256-57.
71. 377 F. Supp. at 264.
72. Id. at 264-65.
73. Id at 265.
74. Id
75. Id at 264. The court noted that the question of the proper "locality" was a
matter of congressional intent and thus "[t]he Secretary is in no better position than
the courts to determine Congressional intent in using the word 'locality' in the Act."
Id at 260. Therefore, the court reasoned, the usual rule of judicial deference to an
administrative finding would not apply. Id
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of the contracting facility.76 Additionally, the court reasoned that the
inability of the Department of Labor to perform the requisite work, if
proven, was a weak basis on which to rest a determination of congres-
sional intent. 77 Third, the court interpreted the "flexibility" intended
by Congress as simply "enabl[ing] the Secretary to determine locali-
ties . . .which would not be bound by municipal or state bounda-
ries."'7  Finally, the court found direct support for the "place of
performance" locality in the legislative history of the Act. 79
Having been unsuccessful in Descomp at persuading adoption of
the place of contracting facility as the applicable locality, the Labor
Department later argued in Southern Packaging and Storage Co. v. United
States for a nationwide definition of locality.8 0 The advantage in de-
fining "locality" as nationwide was clear: the Labor Department
would have to make only a single wage determination for the entire
country.8' The only practical alternative, the Department of Labor
stated, would be a kind of composite locality approach that would be
applicable when a bidding agency neither knew nor cared where the
76. Id. The court reasoned that, in general, the contract work would beperformed
in a single locality despite a multiplicity of bidding localities, and thus no inference
could be drawn from Congress' use of the singular "locality." Id
77. Id. at 265. The court noted that without proof of such inability, it was reluc-
tant to assume such a fact. Id Additionally, the court wrote that "to permit a con-
tract to be awarded when the Secretary has been unable to make the appropriate
wage-determination in time would defeat the implementation of the Act." Id (foot-
note omitted).
78. Id at 265 (citing Hearings on H.R. 10238 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., 12-13 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as 1965 Senate Heartngs]).
79. Id at 265-66. The court pointed to statements of Charles Donahue, Solici-
tor of Labor, describing the Act's use of the term "locality" as "comparable to the
words in the Davis-Bacon Act; city, town, village, or any other political division of
the state in which the work is to be performed." Id. (citing 1965 Senate Hearings, supra
note 78, at 11 (statement of Charles Donahue). For a discussion of the Davis-Bacon
Act, see notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
Defining "locality" as the place of performance has been viewed as restricting
competitive bidding, particularly in light of the 1972 successorship provision. See
Brooks, Service Contract Act Amendments of 1972, 66 MIL. L. REV. 67 (1974). For a
discussion of the practical problems inherent in this interpretation, see notes 179-82
and accompanying text infra.
80. Southern Packaging, 618 F.2d 1088, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980). The contractor,
Southern Packaging, sought a declaratory judgment that the Act was inapplicable to
a contract to produce and assemble "C" rations for the Department of Defense. See
Southern Packaging and Storage Co. v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 726, 731 (D.S.C.
1978). The district court held that the Act applied and that the "locality" for pur-
poses of a wage determination was "the standard metropolitan statistical area, if
available, or the specific county, where the bidding party's plant or facility is lo-
cated." Id at 735.
81. 618 F.2d at 1091.
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contract work would be performed.8 2 In rejecting the government's
arguments for a nationwide rate, the Fourth Circuit relied particu-
larly on the plain meaning of the word "locality as a partiular spot,
situation or location. 8 3  Moreover, it felt that the Labor Depart-
ment's broad definition would be "too expansive, too unwieldy, and
too unfair" to government contractors.8 4
Despite apparent unanimity among the courts on the issue of
locality,8 5 the issue remains problematical, given the pragmatic
problems associated with wage determinations and the Labor Depart-
ment's tendency to apply geographically expansive determinations of
locality.
8 6
C. The Scope of Contractor Ob/igations Under the 1972 Successorshp
Requirement
While some issues arising under the Act have been resolved, the
successorship requirements enacted in 1972 have continued to cause
substantial conflict.8 7 The extent to which a successor contractor
must adhere to any or all the provisions of the contract negotiated
between his predecessor and that contractor's employees has re-
mained a subject of litigation.
Since prior to the enactment of the Act, the Supreme Court had
addressed the issue of successorship in the context of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA), and because commentators and agencies
82. Id. For a discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of this broad definition
of "locality" in a general context, see notes 183-89 and accompanying text infra.
83. 618 F.2d at 1091 (quoting Webster's Third New Internatzonal Dictionagr (1976))
(emphasis added).
84. Id at 1092. The government had argued that a particular locality such as a
city or county was used in 98% of government contract cases and, thus, it was not
unfair to allow a broadened definition in the small number of cases where the place
of performance was unknown. Id at 1091. The court of appeals felt that it did not
impose an "undue burden" on the Labor Department to make more specific wage
determinations in the 0.5% of cases where the department had previously used a
"nationwide" approach. Id Although the court acknowledged the general deference
given to agency determinations, it felt constrained by the language of the Act. 'Id at
1090 n.2.
85. See also Williams v. United States Dep't of Labor, 697 F.2d 842 (8th Cir.
1983) (government conceded controlling precedent of Descomp and Southern Packaging
as to issue of "locality").
86. Subsequently-promulgated Labor Department regulations have persisted in
advocating an "elastic and variable meaning" of locality, taking into consideration
"all the facts and circumstances" pertaining to each wage or fringe benefit determi-
nation. See 29 C.F.R. § 4.163 (1983). For a discussion of continuing problems in the
practical application of the "locality" standard, see notes 176-89 and accompanying
text infra.
87. For a discussion of the 1972 successorship requirements, see)notes 41-46 and
accompanying text supra.
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had paralleled the purposes of the Service Contract Act and the
NLRA, the existing Supreme Court successor precedent seemed to be
a natural starting point for guidance on the interpretation of the suc-
cessorship provisions of the Act.88 Under the NLRA, a new employer
found to be a successor is obliged to recognize and bargain with the
union that was recognized as the employees' representative under the
old employer.89 Clearly, the new employer is not obligated to hire the
previous workforce.90 However, if a substantial number of workers
from the previous workforce are hired, the "substantial continuity of
identity in the business enterprise" and workforce 9t may form a basis
for a finding of successorship. While the successor employer is gener-
ally not bound by the terms of the union's agreements with the prede-
cessor, it must recognize and bargain with the union representative. 92
88. To some extent the successorship problem had arisen prior to the effective
date of the 1972 amendments. See note 41 supra. See also Boeing Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 913 (1975); Kentron Hawaii, Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1973). In Boeing, the court held that, when the successor contractor, in a periodic
rebidding context, employed only 35% of the predecessor's employees, there was in-
sufficient identity of the workforce to obligate the successor to arbitrate under the
predecessor's contract. 504 F.2d at 323. In Kentron Hawaii', the court declined to find
a violation of the successor employer doctrine where the successor's contract was
awarded prior to the enactment of the 1972 amendments, and the previous collective
bargaining agreement terminated with the expiration of the predecessor's contract.
480 F.2d at 1173.
89. See NLRB v. Burns Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (successor employer
bound to recognize and bargain with certified union representative). For a discussion
of the NLRA successorship doctrine, see Barksdale, Successor Liability Under the National
Labor Relations Act and Title VII, 54 TEX. L. REV. 707, 707-11 (1976). For a discussion
of arguments equating the purposes of the NLRA with those of the Service Contract
Act in order to aid in the interpretation of the latter's successorship provision, see
note 41 supra.
90. NLRB v. Burns Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 280 n.5 (1972). "The Board
has never held that the National Labor Relations Act itself requires that an employer
who submits the winning bid for a service contract or who purchases the assets of a
business be obligated to hire all of the employees of the predecessor . . . . However,
an employer who declines to hire employees solely because they are members of a
union commits a § 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice." Id (citation omitted).
91. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964). InJohn
Wiley, the finding of substantial continuity was based on the "relevant similarity and
continuity of operations across the change in ownership. . . evidenced by the whole-
sale transfer of [the predecessor's] employers, to the Wiley plant, apparently without
difficulty." Id See also Burns, 406 U.S. at 274-79. The successorship finding in Bums
was predicated on the fact that a majority (27 of 42) of Burns employees had been
employed by the predecessor, and the operational structures and practices of the
business remained essentially the same despite the change in employer. Id at 278,
280. But cf. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249(1974) (the purchaser of a restaurant who continued the same business but had only
nine employees of the predecessor in its work force of 45 was not a successor, and thus
not bound to recognize or bargain with the union, nor to arbitrate under the agree-
ment made between the predecessor and union).
92. Bums, 406 U.S. at 281-82. In John Wiley, the successor employer was obliged
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In Service Employees' International Union Local 36 v. General Services
Administration ,93 the union sued to compel the successor maintenance-
services contractor to hire the predecessor's employees and to comply
with the compulsory arbitration provision contained in the collective
bargaining agreement negotiated between the union and the prede-
cessor employer.94 The court first rejected the union's contention that
under the NLRA successorship doctrine the employer was bound to
follow the predecessor's agreement. 95
Turning to the separate requirement imposed by the Service
Contract Act, the court examined the legislative history of the 1972
amendments imposing successorship obligations. A Senate report de-
scribed the obligation as one to pay the wages and fringe benefits "to
which the service employees would have been entitled had they been
employed under the predecessor contract. '96 The court reasoned that "the
to comply with the compulsory arbitration clause in the agreement between the
union and the predecessor. 376 U.S. at 550-51. The Court later refused, in Bums, to
bind the successor to the previously existing contract. 405 U.S. at 287. In so holding,
the Court did not overrule Wi'y, but distinguished it. Id at 285-86. Thus, it appears
that although a successor employer is generally not bound by the substantive terms of
the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, it may, under some conditions, be
obligated to comply with a compulsory arbitration provision.
93. 443 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
94. d. at 576. The contract involved was a one-year agreement under which
Ken-Rich Services, Inc. took over cleaning services at the Social Security Building in
Philadelphia, chores which had previously been performed by Prudential Building
Maintenance. Id. When Prudential told Ken-Rich that Ken-Rich would be obli-
gated to use Prudential's employees, Ken-Rich sought advice from the General Serv-
ices Administration (GSA). Id The GSA advised Ken-Rich that it "could hire its
own employees so long as the new employees were to be paid at levels established by
the Secretary of Labor and set out in the contract." Id (footnote omitted). There-
upon, the union representing the predecessor's employees filed suit challenging the
GSA's opinion, seeking to compel Ken-Rich to utilize the Prudential employees. Id.
95. Id at 577-78. In a workforce of 40, only one employee had worked for the
predecessor. Id. at 576.
96. Id at 579 (emphasis supplied) (quoting S. REP. No. 1131, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted bi 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 3534, 3536). The union
had relied on the statement of Sen. Gurney that
regardless of how loyal or how hard working or how skilled an employee is,
regardless of how long he has been working under one of these service con-
tracts, he faces the possibility every year or so, that a new. company will
come in and successfully underbid his employer.
When this happens he finds himself possibly out of work, definitely
reduced in income, fringe benefits, seniority and stripped of pension
rights. ...
This legislation confronted the Congress with the decision as to
whether or not it is moral to trade men's wages and careers for the sake of
expediency. And Congress has today decided in the negative.
118 CONG. REC. 31,282 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Gurney). However, the court char-
acterized these remarks as merely broad statements, and found the legislative history
to lead to the conclusion that employers, even when succeeding to a service contract,
are free to hire their own workforces. For example, the court quoted the arguments
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phrase emphasized above clearly show[ed] Congress anticipated that
successor contractors would not always retain employees of their
predecessors." 97 Relying on this legislative history and the lack of ex-
plicit language in the 1972 amendment requiring a successor to hire
the predecessor's work force, the court concluded that the Local 36
employer had not violated the Service Contract Act in hiring a new
work force. 98 Furthermore, the court refused to find the employer
bound by the predecessor's compulsory arbitration provision because
the Service Contract Act was designed only to protect wage and bene-
fit levels. 99
The next case on successorship further narrowed the successor
employer's obligations. In Trinity Services, Inc. v. Marshall,'00 the court,
agreeing with the Local 36 opinion, held that in the 1972 Amendment
Congress did not intend to ensure job continuity for individual em-
ployees, but rather desired to maintain wage and benefit levels de-
spite turnover in contractors.' 0 ' The court then found that neither
seniority rights nor severence pay are "wages or fringe benefits"
within the meaning of the successorship provision of the Act:10 2 "Sen-
iority is not a form of compensation that the employer can pay. It is
not specifically listed as a . . . fringe benefit, and it is not in the same
class as the other benefits listed there."'' 0 3 As for severance pay, the
court held that there is no "obligation. . . to adhere to a provision in
a collective bargaining agreement that requires the successor to make
a payment to the predecessor's- employees if that work force is not
hired by the successor." 104
made by Rep. Blackburn in opposing the 1972 amendments, that the wages and
benefits paid by a successor employer could not be less than those paid by the prede-
cessor "even if the successor contractor employs his own work force and does not retain any of the
predecessor contractor's employees. " 118 CONG. REc. 27,139 (1972) (emphasis added) (re-
marks of Rep. Blackburn).
97. 443 F. Supp. at 579.
98. Id. at 579-80.
99. Id. at 580.
100. 593 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In making a wage determination binding
on bidders for the successor contract, the DOL had excluded the severance pay and
seniority provisions existing in the predecessor's contract. Id at 1254-55. Both the
existing contractor and the unions representing its employees sought to compel the
inclusion of the provisions in the wage determination, particularly to insure that a
successor contract would grant severance pay to any of the predecessor's employees
not hired by the successor. Id at 1255.
101. Id at 1260-61.
102. Id at 1262.
103. Id
104. Id at 1262. The court noted that all the examples of fringe benefits listed
in the Service Contract Act required the employer "to incur a present cost or... risk
of a future cost." Id at 1257. However the severance provision at issue in TrIni
Servi'ces was to apply only to the successor and never to the predecessor, and thus it
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D. The Imposition of Penaltizes
The Service Contract Act provides as a sanction for violating the
Act that "[u]nless the Secretary otherwise recommends because of un-
usual circumstances, no contract of the United States shall be
awarded to the persons of firms [found by federal agencies to have
violated the Act] . . . until three years have elapsed ... . Two
arguments are available to a contractor who wishes to contest its
ouster from participation in federal contracts. First, the contractor
could argue that the agency incorrectly found that it had violated the
Act. Under this approach, however, the contractor bears the burden
of proving that the agency finding is not supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.106 A second approach is to challenge the Labor
Department's finding of no "unusual circumstances" which would
justify lifting the three-year bar.
Both these arguments were made by the contractor in Federal
Food Services, Inc. v. Donovan .1o7 The district court in Federal Food Serv-
ices upheld the Labor Department's finding of violations based on
repeated underpayments to employees. 08 While this ruling was up-
held on appeal,10 9 the appeals court went on to consider the issue of
did not qualify as a fringe benefit as there was no "present risk" or "future cost" to
the predecessor. Id. at 1258. The court also expressed some concern that the provi-
sion for severance pay was not necessarily the result of "arms-length negotiations," as
required by § 353(c) of the Act. Id. at 1259. The Fifth Circuit has also held that
seniority rights are not within the scope of the successorship obligations. Clark v.
Unified Serv., 659 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981).
105. 41 U.S.C. § 354(a) (1976). The Act directs the Comptroller General to
compile and distribute a list of violators to all federal agencies. Id
106. United States v. Powers Bldg. Maintenance Co., 336 F. Supp. 819, 822
(W.D. Okla. 1972).
107. 658 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. Id at 831. Federal, the contractor, had provided mess attendant services at
scattered military installations for a two-year period. Id. During the contract period,
the Labor Department instituted an investigation of Federal's contract performance,
resulting in the payment by Federal ofjust over $400 to seven employees at a South
Carolina base for time worked but not paid. Id. Subsequent investigation revealed
slightly over $3,100 in deficiencies in wages and benefits at five other locations. Id. at
832. After formal hearings, a Labor Department administrative law judge found
Federal in violation of the Act and the Secretary affirmed refusing to find "unusual
circumstances." Id Accordingly, Federal was barred from future contract participa-
tion. Id.
109. Id. at 833-34. Initially, the court considered the question of whether the
agency action was reviewable at all, but held that there was neither clear and con-
vincing evidence of legislative intent to preclude review nor statutory authority so
broadly drawn as to preclude review. Id. at 832-33. The court noted particular
legislative history showing an intent to specifically limit the Secretary's authority to
avoid the debarment sanction. Id. at 832-33 (citing S. REP. No. 1131, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3534, 3536). See also Mid-
west Maintenance & Constr. Co. v. Vela, 621 F.2d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1980).
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unusual circumstances.
Under DOL guidelines, unusual circumstances are to be deter-
mined on the basis of the facts of the individual case, with particular
emphasis on six factors: 1) whether there is a history of repeated vio-
lations; 2) the nature and extent of violations; 3) the willfulness of the
defendant's conduct; 4) the existence of bona fide legal issues of
doubtful certainty; 5) the existence of good faith cooperation in the
resolution of issues; and 6) the promptness with which employees
were paid money owed. 110
In interpreting these guidelines, the Federal Food Services court
noted the Labor Department's opinion that
[i]t is clear that the mere payment of sums found due em-
ployees after an administrative proceeding, coupled with an
assurance of future compliance, is not in itself sufficient to
constitute "unusual circumstances" warranting relief from
the ineligible list sanction. It is also clear that a history of
recurrent violations of identical nature, such as repeated vi-
olations of identical minimum wage or record-keeping pro-
visions, does not permit a finding of "unusual
circumstances." "'
The court advised that in a case such as the one before it, where
each violation taken separately was virtually "de minimus," the La-
bor Department must consider carefully the particular circumstances
of the business under review before barring it from further contract
work." 2 This, the court stated, was because the Congress clearly did
not intend for the bar penalty to be levied lightly: "The very absence
of any sanction other than the catastrophic one of three years debar-
ment supports the legislative history that use of debarment against
innocent and petty violations was not intended."' 3 Given that these
circumstances were present in the Federal Food Services case, the court
remanded the matter to the district court with an order to vacate the
bar penalty." 4 The court did, however, acknowledge the broad dis-
cretion given to the Labor Department: "We do not suggest that a
'pure heart' and a lack of willfulness are sufficient to show unusual
circumstances. The Secretary was accorded broad discretion by Con-
gress. However, when findings are made they must respect the guide-
110. 658 F.2d at 833 (quoting Washington Moving & Storage Co., No. SCA-
168, March 12, 1974).
111. Id
112. Id at 834.
113. Id
114. Id.
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lines by which the Secretary exercises his discretion."' 15 The court
found that without evidentiary support for a finding of negligence in
the management of the company, the bar on Federal Food's federal
contract participation was arbitrary.1 16
E. Standing to Sue Under the Service Contract Act
While the Service Contract Act expressly provides for enforce-
ment actions by the United States, 1 7 it contains no provision for a
private right of action. Nonetheless, litigants have sought damages
against contractors for alleged violations of the Act based on an im-
plied right of action.'" 8 However, three federal appellate courts have
held, for varying reasons, that the Act does not sustain a private right
of action for damages.
In perhaps the most definitive opinion to date, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held in Miscellaneous Service Workers, Drivers
&Helpers, Teamsters Local 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp. 119 that the Act does
not provide a private remedy for the employees of a successor con-
tractor against that contractor for failure to comply with the fringe-
benefit provisions of a predecessor contract. 20 The Ninth Circuit an-
alyzed the question as one of legislative intent. 12' The court found
that while the plaintiffs unquestionably were members of "a class for
whose especial benefit the statute was passed," the legislative history
indicated a congressional intent to provide for exclusive administra-
115. Id The court held that where the Secretary "relies on a history of previous
violations to support debarment, he must apply the standards of reasonable manage-
ment to them as well." Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id Particularly, the court noted the "small ratio of violations to value of
contracts." Id Additionally, the court noted that "[t]here are no facts in the record
to refute the judicial belief that no rational precautions could reduce violations to
absolute zero." Id.
117. 41 U.S.C. § 354(b) (1976). The Act provides as follows:
If the accrued payments withheld under the terms of the contract [as pro-
vided in 41 U.S.C. § 352(a)] are insufficient to reimburse all service employ-
ees with respect to whom there has been a failure to pay the compensation
required pursuant to this chapter, the United States may bring action
against the contractor, subcontractor, or any sureties in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction to recover the remaining amount of underpayments.
Id
118. This should, however, be distinguished from an action by a disappointed
contract bidder to compel compliance with the Act by a federal contracting agency.
In this situation the contract bidder has uniformly been found to have standing. See
American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977);
Descomp, 377 F. Supp. at 258-59.
119. 661 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. Id. at 781.
121. Id at 780 (citing Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)).
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tive enforcement of the Act. ' 2 2 It should be noted that the Philco-Ford
decision is the only decision on this issue to apply the appropriate
Supreme Court implied private rights precedent. 123
In two remaining cases, presenting a somewhat different factual
pattern, suit was brought by federal civil service employees who were
displaced by private contracting to set aside the grant of a federal
contract. 124 Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits found that the former
civil service employees were not within the "zone of interests" in-
tended to be protected by the statute. 25 Additionally, both courts
found that the former employees could not assert the interests of the
allegedly underpaid present employees of the contractor because the
plaintiff's interests were plainly antithetical to those of the present
employees. 2 6
F. Other Issues Aristzg in Service Contract Act Litigation
The remaining cases under the statute have dealt with a plethora
of issues. These cases have raised the following issues: the scope of
the Act's application to government agencies as contracting agencies;
the applicable statutes of limitations on permissible actions under the
Act; contract annulment; and the circumstances under which prelimi-
nary injunctive relief will be available to unsuccessful bidders.
122. 661 F.2d at 780-81. The court applied the Supreme Court's four-part test
for determining the existence of a private right of action. Id at 780. This test re-
quires an examination of 1) whether the plaintiff is "one of a class for whose especial
benefit the statute was created"; 2) whether there is any indication of a legislative
intent to fashion such a remedy; 3) whether such a remedy is consistent with the
underlying legislative scheme; and 4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally
relegated to state law. Id (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1972)). The court partic-
ularly noted that a private right of action would be "flatly inconsistent with the
express provision of a limited governmental cause of action." 661 F.2d at 780. See
note 120 supra.
123. 661 F.2d at 780. The other courts of appeals decisions on the issue of
standing have focused on the nature of the plaintiff's injury. See American Fed. of
Gov't Employees v. Stetson, 640 F.2d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1981); American Fed. of
Gov't Employees v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977); International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Hodgson, 515 F.2d 373, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
124. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Stetson, 640 F.2d 642, 643 (5th Cir.
1981); American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir.
1977).
125. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Stetson, 640 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir.
1981); American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir.
1977).
126. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Stetson, 640 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir.
1981); American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.
1977). In both cases, plaintiffs attempted to justify suit on a theory ofjls terii stand-
ing, asserting the rights of third parties not party to the suit. Stetson, 640 F.2d at 645;
Dunn, 561 F.2d at 1313. See generall Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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Brtnk's, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sstem 127 in-
volved an action to restrain the performance of a federal service con-
tract allegedly in violation of the Act. The Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, the contracting agency, argued that it should not be
bound by the requirements of the Service Contract Act because it was
essentially a private bank.12  In determining that the Federal Re-
serve Bank was bound by the Act's requirements, the court relied on
the general remedial nature of the Act, which supports an inclusive
rather than an exclusive interpretation in order to protect as many
workers as possible.129 Furthermore, the court noted that "[w]hile the
Act does not define its use of the terms 'United States' or 'Federal
Government,' they must be liberally construed to effectuate the Act's
humanitarian purposes .... ,,130
In Untied States v. Deluxe Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. ,'13 the Fourth
Circuit was called upon to determine the applicable statute of limita-
tions in an action to recover Service Contract Act underpayments.132
The contractor argued for a two-year statute of limitations, based on
the federal Portal-to-Portal Act 133 which specifically bars actions by
the government to enforce the minimum wage requirements of the
Walsh-Healey Act 134 not brought within two years of accrual.'3 5
127. 466 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1979).
128. Id at 117. In Brink's, the prior contractor sought to restrain the perform-
ance of a contract between the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) and a successor contrac-
tor where that contract was entered into without a wage determination. Id.
129. Id. at 118. In response to the Bank's contention that it was essentially a
private bank, the court noted that while the FRB is owned by its member banks,
there is a "long-standing relationship between the Federal Reserve Banks and the
federal government and its economy." Id Furthermore, the court noted that under
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, "[t]he Reserve Banks are corporate instrumentalities
of the federal government." Id (citing 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982)). Additionally, the
court referred to past federal case precedent recognizing the Federal Reserve Banks
as agencies of the federal government for purposes other than Service Contract Act
analysis. Id at 119 (citing Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Kalin, 77 F.2d 50,
51 (4th Cir. 1935); Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 34 F.2d 910, 916
(2d Cir. 1929); A.M.R., Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, No. 44387
(N.D. Cal. 1966) (unreported); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Register of
Deeds, 288 Mich. 120, 284 N.W. 667 (1939)).
130. 466 F. Supp. at 120. The court noted that the Service Contract Act was
"designed to provide 'much needed labor standards protection for employees of con-
tractors and subcontractors furnishing services to or performing maintenance service
for Federal agencies.'" Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 948, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1).
131. 511 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1975).
132. Id at 927.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1976). The Portal-to-Portal Act requires that "any ac-
tion ... to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages" must be brought
within two years. Id.
134. For a discussion of the Walsh-Healey Act, see notes 14-15 and accompany-
ing text supra.
135. See note 133 supra.
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However, the Fourth Circuit rejected the contractor's analogy by ob-
serving that unlike the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Service Contract Act
contains no limitations provision, 36 and instead applied the general
six-year limitations period applicable to actions brought by the fed-
eral government. 137
In Curtiss- Wright Corp. v. McLucas 138 the New Jersey district court
was asked to determine the circumstances under which an unsuccess-
ful bidder may compel annulment of a contract granted by a federal
agency not complying with the Act, where that failure results from
the acts of the federal agency. 139 The court held that where the fed-
eral agency fails to subject the contract in question to the require-
ments of the Act in the good faith belief that the Act does not apply
to that contract, annulment may not be compelled. 140 However, the
court rejected any notion that mere "inconvenience" to the con-
tracting agency would, by itself, be enough to justify the continuation
of a noncomplying contract.'41
In another "unsuccessful bidder" case, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in Serv-Ai, Inc. v. Seamans,142 was asked to
determine the grounds under which the disappointed bidder could
obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain performance of a federal
contract. 143 The court affirmed the district court's findings that the
plaintiff bidder had failed to show either a "probability of success on
136. 511 F.2d at 929. The defendant argued that the Portal-to-Portal Act
should apply because of the specific inclusion of the minimum wage standard of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the administrative procedure requirements of the
Walsh-Healey Act. Id at 928. In response, the Fourth Circuit noted "substantial
differences in the Government's cause of action under Section 2 of the Walsh-Healey
Act and Section 5 of the Service Act." Id at 929. In a thinly-veiled rebuke to Con-
gress, the court noted that "this controversy stems from the structure and draftsman-
ship of the Service Act which, concededly, leaves something to be desired. Id at 928.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1976). Section 2415(a) provides that "except as other-
wise provided by Congress, every action [by the United States] for money damages
• . . shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of
action accrues. . . ." Id
138. 381 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1974).
139. Id. at 658-59. The contract in question involved the overhaul, repair and
maintenance of jet engines for the U.S. Air Force. Id at 660.
140. Id at 664-65. The court noted that "an agency must come to some initial
determination, under its own discretion, as to whether the SCA applies to work to be
performed in a service contract." Id at 664 (emphasis added). At the time, there was
substantial doubt as to whether the Act was intended to cover a jet engine repair
contract. See id. at 665 n. 12. For a discussion of past ambiguities in the scope of the
Act's coverage, see notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
141. 381 F. Supp. at 664. The Air Force cited potential delay and harm to the
"defense posture" of the United States. Id
142. 473 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
143. Id. at 159.
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the merits" or that there was no rational basis for the grant of the
contract. 144 Specifically, the court found that the losing bidder's un-
supported affidavit alleging that the contract failed to comply with
the Act was insufficient to support a preliminary injunction.145
IV. PRAGMATIC ISSUES IN AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
More than simply posing difficult legal problems, the Service
Contract Act presents serious pragmatic problems which also under-
mine the effective administration of the Act. The January, 1983
GAO report 146 levels its most severe criticism at the practical
problems encountered by the Labor Department in determining ac-
curate "prevailing" wages and fringe benefits. 47 Two other prag-
matic issues, the "locality" question' 48 and the "service employee"
question, further weaken the efficacy of the Act.' 49 Moreover, hap-
hazard compliance with the Act by federal agencies and political vac-
illations inherent in the federal rulemaking and enforcement process
must be added to this web of practical difficulties. 50
A. Ditultt'es in the Determination of "Prevat'ng" Wages and Benefits
According to the recent GAO report, the Labor Department is
vividly aware of inherent ambiguities in the Act and of the effect of
those ambiguities on the establishment of minimum wages and bene-
fits.' 5  However, the Department has established two basic principles
for the determinations. First, where one rate is paid to most employ-
144. Id at 158. See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (a preliminary injunction restraining performance of a contract granted under
the Armed Services Procurement Act should not be granted without a showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits); Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (a preliminary injunction should not issue against performance of a mili-
tary contract unless it is shown that the agency action is without any rational basis).
145. 473 F.2d at 159.
146. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 10.
147. For a discussion of difficulties in the determination of "prevailing" wages
and benefits, see notes 151-75 and accompanying text infra.
148. For a discussion of practical implications of the "locality" question, see
notes 176-89 and accompanying text infra.
149. For a discussion of practical implications of the "service employee" ques-
tion, see notes 190-203 and accompanying text unfra.
150. For a discussion of agencies' compliance and enforcement of the Service
Contract Act, see text accompanying notes 204-25 infra.
151. CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER,supra note 8, at 10-11. The Labor Depart-
ment's 1978 manual, entitled "The Predetermination of Wage Rates and Fringe Ben-
efits under the Service Contract Act, A Manual of Policies and Procedures,"
recognizes the ambiguity of the term "prevailing." Id. at 10. The manual states that
the term "prevailing" "is not subject to any precise single formula nor to any exact
definition which would be appropriate in all instances," but rather must be viewed in
light of all relevant information. Id.
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ees in a locality, that rate will be "prevailing." Second, if there is no
single rate, the prevailing rate is to be based on "central tenden-
cies"-that is, the median or mean.1 52
The Labor Department's practice of using central tendencies to
establish minimum pay for service contract workers has had an infla-
tionary result, according to the GAO.
Such prevailing rates, by their nature, do not recognize the
limited skills and experience of newly-hired or entry-level
workers and assume that all workers in a job classification
are entitled to the same wage rate. Moreover, once a pre-
vailing rate is established in a wage determination as the
minimum that can be paid, it becomes the floor for adjust-
ing the wage differentials for higher skilled and more exper-
ienced workers in the same job class and for later revising
that rate in future determinations. This can quickly esca-
late wages paid service workers on federal contracts and can
create or widen a gap between the federally-mandated rates
on [Service Contract Act] covered contracts and those being
paid private sector workers in the same job classifications
153
Additionally, the GAO reports that the Labor Department's princi-
ples and its methods for making wage determinations have resulted in
inaccurate, unrealistic determinations. Specifically, the determina-
tions do not (and perhaps can not) consider work experience, eco-
nomic changes, industrial technological obsolescence (or advances),
or working conditions. 54
In a review of the 150 Labor Department wage determinations,
the GAO found that the Department has used a variety of data
sources, particularly Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, Service
Contract Act and Davis-Bacon Act wage surveys, collective bargain-
ing agreements within a particular industry, non-appropriated fund
wage schedules, incumbent nonunion contractor rates, state and local
government rates, and the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum
wage.' 55 Despite this variety of available data sources, however, in
thirty-four of the 150 wage determinations surveyed, the prior rate
152. Id at 11. If the second principle is applied, the Labor Department prefers
using the median rate rather than the mean. Id.
153. Id
154. Id at 11-12. Weather and physical facilities are examples of working con-
ditions which may affect the prevailing wage determination. Id at 12. The presence
or absence of tariffs may also be a determining factor. Id
155. Id at 16-17.
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was simply increased without the benefit of any current data to estab-
lish a current rate. 156 Further, the GAO contended that these data
sources were, in many cases, inapplicable to the job classifications or
the localities for which wage rates were being determined. 157 In par-
ticular, the GAO findings indicated that the Labor Department "re-
lied heavily" on BLS data compiled for purposes other than Service
Contract Act determinations; 158 that the Department erred in using
non-appropriated fund system wage rates for Service Contract Act
purposes; 159 that it improperly used Davis-Bacon Act wage rates for
incomparable job classifications under the Service Contract Act; 16°
and that it improperly used union contract wage rates. 161
As a single example of how the data source utilized could result
in inappropriate wage determinations, consider that the bulk of La-
bor Department wage determinations reviewed by the GAO relied,
for data, on BLS surveys of businesses with more than fifty employ-
ees.' 62 In larger metropolitan areas, the BLS generally excluded busi-
nesses with less than 100 employees. 163  Nonetheless, requests to
federal agencies by contract bidders for Service Contract Act wage
determinations have generally indicated a need for fewer than fifty
employees. 164 In fact in 77.5% of those requests, ten or fewer employ-
ees were needed.165 Since GAO wage surveys had already shown that
larger organizations are likely to pay higher wages than the smaller
organizations expected to be competing for contracts requiring only a
156. Id at 17.
157. Id The GAO's conclusions were based on a review of docket files support-
ing the wage determinations and interviews with officials from the Labor Depart-
ment's Wage and Hour Division. Id
158. Id The BLS Wage Surveys relied upon data not necessarily representative
of the wages and benefits of most government service contract employees, or of the
localities for which the determinations were requested. Id
159. Id The nonappropriated-fund system-wage rates were used for job classifi-
cations which, if not contracted, would have been performed by higher-paid federal
appropriated-fund wage-system employees. Id
160. Id Construction-worker wage rates, developed for Davis-Bacon Act wage
decisions, were applied to service employees on non-construction jobs. Id
161. Id Collective bargaining rates were applied within and beyond specific lo-
calities on the basis of asserted union dominance in the locality, according to the
GAO. Id
162. Id at 19. Businesses with less than 50 workers were included only in the
surveys of the laundry and dry cleaning, moving and storage, refuse hauling, and
food service industries. Id
163. Id
164. Id.
165. Id In 241 out of 311 contracts, 10 or fewer workers were estimated to be
needed. Id In 193 of those 241 contracts, five or fewer workers were estimated to be
needed. Id In only 16 of the 311 contracts, was it estimated that 50 or more workers
would be needed. Id
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few workers, 166 the data garnered from surveys of larger businesses
would seem to be of questionable relevance.
In addition, the GAO found that the types of businesses included
in BLS surveys relied on by the Labor Department were not represen-
tative of federal services contractors.167 In particular, the GAO noted
that the Labor Department tended to rely on a BLS "all-indusrry '"168
wage rate. 169 The "all-industry" rate combined high-paying manu-
facturing job rates with non-manufacturing rates, resulting in an ar-
tifically high wage determination for service contracts. 170
The GAO found that, compounding the problem of inappropri-
ate data sources, the Labor Department made inappropriate adjust-
ments to already inappropriate BLS figures. 17 1 For example, the
GAO found that the DOL combined BLS data from several individ-
ual locations as a basis for statewide or even multistate applications,
despite wide variance among the locations. 172 Moreover, the DOL
adjusted BLS survey rates to reflect national patterns without consid-
ering major differences in wage structures among various localities. ' 73
In most cases, according to the GAO, Labor Department deter-
minations have resulted in requiring contracts subject to the Service
Contract Act to provide for higher wages and benefits than those ac-
tually prevailing in the particular location. In cases where specific
wage data was available, contract costs were up to 11.6% higher than
they would have been if actual prevailing wages and benefits were
166. The GAO's wage surveys did, in fact, indicate that large organizations with
many employees generally paid higher wages than smaller organizations with fewer
employees. Id at 18.
167. Id
168. Id at 19. The BLS wage surveys covered six broad industry categories:
manufacturing; transportation; communication and other public utilities; wholesale
trade; retail trade; finance, insurance and real estate; and other selected services. Id
The surveys usually excluded agriculture, mining, construction, educational and
medical services, and government operations. Id
169. Id The BLS wage-survey reports generally broke down wage data into
three categories: manufacturing; nonmanufacturing; and "all industries," which
combined the first two categories. Id The reports. did not differentiate among the
particular industries surveyed. Id
170. Id The GAO report noted that the nonmanufacturing jobs were more in-
dicative of the work done by service contractors on government contracts than those
in the manufacturing industries. See id at 20.
171. Id at 22. The Department of Labor adjusts the BLS data to eliminate
abnormalities in the data caused by different methods of compensation. Id The BLS
data is also adjusted to give "due consideration," as required by the Service Contract
Act, to the wages which would be paid the service workers if they were federal direct-
hire employees. Id
172. Id at 23.
173. Id
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used. 174 The Labor Department's use of inappropriate data and
methodology has resulted in improper wage and benefit determina-
tions, undercutting the basic purpose of the Service Contract Act to
require adherence to the prevailing local wage rate.
B. Practical Imphications of the "Locality'" Issue
In a previous section, the "locality" question was discussed in the
context of litigation, focusing primarily upon congressional intent. 175
There are, however, substantial practical considerations involved in
the determination of "locality." Each possible definition of "locality"
presents its own strengths and weaknesses. In applying the statutory
provision, locality might logically mean the place of the contracting
federal facility, the principal place of business of the contractor, or
the place where the work is actually to be done. Moreover, in each
alternative, the scope of the locality must be determined. 17 6
1. "Locahty" as the Place of the Contracting Federal Agency
The application of "locality" as the place of the contracting fed-
eral agency presents inherent difficulties. For example, in a contract
for government printing services, the contracting agency would often
be in Washington D.C., while potential bidders could be anywhere in
the country. It is certain that wages for printing employees differ
widely among the various regions of the nation. However, by the ap-
plication of this standard of "locality," federal contractors will be re-
quired to pay the "prevailing" wages for printing employees in
Washington D.C.
Assuming, hypothetically, that the contract were awarded to a
printer in Mississippi and that wages for printing employees were
lower in Mississippi than in Washington, the award of the contract to
the Mississippi printer would have an inflationary effect upon Missis-
sippi wages and benefits. It would follow that only contractors whose
174. Id at 34. Contract costs were estimated to be 9.9 to 11.6% higher than they
would have been had the prevailing rates been used. Id In addition, in a majority of
the surveyed localities, the fringe benefits the department required service contractors
to provide to their workers were significantly higher than those found to be actually
prevailing. Id at 34-35.
175. For a discussion of case law considering the "locality" question, see text
accompanying notes 68-86 supra.
176. The "locality" may be interpreted to mean a single town, a county, a met-
ropolitan area or some other measure. "Locality" has also been unsuccessfully ar-
gued as nationwide. See Southern Packaging and Storage Co. v. United States, 618
F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Southern Packaging and the nationwide
"locality" issue, see notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Labor Department practices in defining "locality," see notes 184-88 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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wages and benefits were already higher than those "prevailing" in
Washington, would bid on the contract in this situation. Potential
contractors from areas of lower wages, perhaps the less industrialized
areas of the country, would be discouraged from participation in the
bidding process.
2. "Locah'ty" as the Principal Place of the Contractor's Business
Defining "locality" as the principal place of the contractor's
business is equally fraught with difficulty. A wage determination set
on this basis may be just as artificial as one set on the basis of the
place of the contracting facility, since the work will not necessarily be
performed at the principal place of business.
For example, a large chemical company might contract with the
federal government to perform certain research. If, hypothetically,
the company's principal place of business were in Georgia, wages
"prevailing" there would control the determination of wages to be
paid for the contract work. If, however, the contract were to be per-
formed in northern New Jersey, where, hypothetically, wages are
higher than in Georgia, the Labor Department wage determination
would be artificially low and the Act's purpose to prevent "wage-
busting" 177 would be weakened.
3. "Locality" as the Place of Performance
In view of the protective purposes of the Act, the most logical
interpretation of "locality" is that place where the work is to be per-
formed. The governmental interest should be to protect service work-
ers in light of the earnings of workers around them who must exist in
the same economic climate. This commonsense approach seems the
most practical until the 1972 "successorship" requirements 178 are
taken into account.
For example, if a contract bidder located in Detroit were
awarded a federal service contract for work to be performed in De-
troit, it would make sense for the Labor Department to determine the
minimum wages to be paid on the basis of those "prevailing" in De-
troit. If, however, the contract were to be re-bid five years later 79
and awarded to a bidder operating in Pueblo, Colorado, where, hypo-
177. For a discussion of the prevention of "wage-busting" as the purpose behind
the Service Contract Act, see notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
178. For a discussion of the 1972 amendments, see notes 35-46 and accompany-
ing text supra.
179. Multi-year contracts are permitted up to a maximum of five years. Service
Contract Act of 1965, § 4(d) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 353(d) (1976)).
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thetically, wages are lower than in Detroit, the new contractor would
be obligated to pay at least the wages specified in the Detroit con-
tract.180 Clearly, this also presents the potential of wage inflation s1'
and lends no particular support to the protective purposes of the Act.
4. Administrative Difticulties Inherent in the "Locah/ty" Issue
None of the possible alternatives for defining "locality" is com-
pletely acceptable. Moreover, the additional question of the proper
scope of the applicable "locality" also presents a difficult administra-
tive dilemma. It should be noted that if the widest possible scope is
given to the term "locality"-the Labor Department's "nationwide"
standard 1a 2-the entire concept of locality becomes meaningless. The
Service Contract Act would then become its own Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act with a national minimum wage applicable to service work-
ers based on broad Labor Department wage determinations.
Alternatively, if a highly restrictive "locality" standard is applied, se-
vere practical problems in the administrative setting of wage determi-
nations will arise.
For example, if the "place of performance" standard of locality
were applied and 100 potential contractors from 100 localities were to
bid for the contract, the Labor Department would be responsible for
100 determinations of "prevailing" wages and benefits. As discussed
above, the Labor Department's record for making the requisite deter-
minations has left much to be desired. 83 Any interpretation of the
Act multiplying the potential number of wage determinations will
threaten even further the efficiency of Service Contract Act
enforcement.
The Labor Department's recognition of the inherent administra-
tive difficulties with the "locality" standard is evident in regulations
promulgated under the Service Contract Act.'8 4 The Department
has contended that "[i]t is . . .not possible to devise any precise sin-
gle formula which would define the exact geographic limits of a 'lo-
180. Further, if the Detroit company were unionized, the union and the com-
pany could have agreed to artificially high future wage increases which would affect
later employees working under the contract in other places.
181. For a discussion of wage inflation resulting from difficulties in determining
"prevailing" wages, see notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra.
182. The Labor Department has argued, unsuccessfully, for a "nationwide"
standard for the term "locality." See Southern Packaging and Storage Co. v. United
States, 618 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Southern Packaging and the
nationwide "locality" issue, see notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra.
183. For a discussion of the Labor Department's difficulties in determining
"prevailing" wages and benefits, see notes 151-74 and accompanying text supra.
184. Labor Standards for Federal Service Contracts, 29 C.F.R. Part 4 (1983).
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cality' that would be relevant or appropriate for the determination of
prevailing wage rates and prevailing fringe benefits in all situations
under the Act."' 8 5 Relying on "an elastic and variable meaning," the
Labor Department's regulations provide that a locality may be "a
city, a county, several counties comprising a metropolitan area, an
entire state, a geographic region, or the entire country."186 Despite judi-
cial rejection of the nationwide standard, 87 the Department has con-
tinued to make wage determinations for broad regional and even
nationwide "localities.' 88
C. Practical Implications of the "Servi'ce Employee" Issue
A number of administrative difficulties have arisen from the
broadened scope of the Act's application to "service employees"
working under federal government contracts.'8 9 While the original
purpose of the Act was to prevent the exploitation of service workers
comparable to federal blue-collar civil-service employees, 190 the Act
has clearly gone far afield from that purpose.
The Labor Department took to heart the 1976 amendments,
which effectively brought beneath the Act's umbrella any service em-
ployee under a contract that had as a "principal purpose" the provi-
sion of services to the government. In 1979, when the Labor
Department applied wage determinations to computer support serv-
ice employees, several major firms rejected bid solicitations for gov-
ernment contracts rather than subject themselves to the terms of the
Act.' 9 ' In the words of one company official, "Why apply a cure
when there is no disease?"'' 92 In congressional testimony, the Com-
puter and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA)
argued for permanent exemption from the Act's coverage on the
ground that an administrative wage-setting approach was "totally in-
compatible with the merit pay wage policy prevalent in our indus-
185. Id § 4.163.
186. See CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citing the Labor
Department's wage determination manual) (emphasis added). Determining factors
include the geographic scope of the data on which the determination was made, the
nature of the services being procured, and the procurement method being used. Id
at 13.
187. See notes 80-86 and accompanying text supra.
188. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
189. See notes 68-88 and accompanying text supra.
190. For a discussion of the Act's purpose of preventing exploitation of "blue
collar" service workers, see notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
191. See Chalupsky, Business Machine Firms Rap US Contract Rules, Washington
Post, Aug. 8, 1979, at C5, col. 2 (noting particularly the objection of the Digital
Equipment Corp. and the Hewlett-Packard Co.).
192. Id
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try. '1 9 3 Comparing its employees with those the Act was meant to
protect, the CBEMA noted that its workers were, for the most part,
skilled, well-compensated, and highly sought-after, and stated:
The characteristics of our industry make SCA coverage un-
necessary. The SCA was passed to prevent the procurement
policy of awarding contracts to the lowest bidder, from in-
ducing bidders on labor contracts to reduce wages to get
government contracts, i.e., "wage bust." There is no such
pattern of abuse in our industry, and one would not expect
to find such a pattern. In general, our service workers are
skilled and highly trained employees whose services are in
demand in a highly competitive labor market. They are
well-compensated, possess a high degree of job mobility and
thus are not susceptible to wage busting. 94
Moreover, CBEMA testimony asserted that the application of the Act
to contracts for computer services would "diminish innovation and
productivity within the [contracting] company."195
A 1979 decision by the Department of Labor to apply the Act to
federal contracts providing for maintenance and repair services con-
nected with purchases and rentals of supplies and equipment led to a
study by the United States Comptroller General. Its conclusion was
similar to the assertions of the computer services industry. 196 That
report emphasized that the practice of "wage-busting" had never
been a problem in the computer industry 19 7 and concluded that the
application of the Act to the computer industry would be unnecessa-
193. 1981 Oversight Hearings, supra note 6, at 501 (statement of Vico E. Hen-
riques, President, CBEMA). See also id. at 600-03 (statement of Ed Truitt, Corporate
Compensation and Benefits Manager, Hewlett-Packard Co., on behalf of the Scien-
tific Apparatus Makers Association) (prevailing wage rates deemed incompatible
with merit pay wage policy). But see id at 157-59 (statement of George J. Poulin,
Executive Vice-President, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO) (merit pay system compatible with prevailing wage
determinations).
194. Id. at 501 (statement of Vico E. Henriques, President, CBEMA).
195. Id. CBEMA claimed that abolishment of the merit pay system would result
in diminished innovation and productivity. Id. Though an alternative to abolishing
the merit pay system, creation of a separate workforce to handle government con-
tacts, CBEMA argues, would cause a deterioration in service support to the federal
government and would also adversely affect the job mobility of the employees in-
volved. Id. Consequently, CBEMA notes, a CBEMA member company faced with
these alternatives may determine that continued servicing of government equipment
is uneconomical and should be discontinued. Id
196. See SCA, ADP and High Technology, supra note 53, at 2 (Maintenance
and repair contracts previously were thought to be only subject to the Walsh-Healey
Public Contracts Act).
197. Id at 9, 42, 53.
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rily costly and destructive of worker morale.198 At stake, the Comp-
troller General noted, were $5.4 billion of government computers in
need of proper maintenance and repair, the space shuttle program,
governmental health maintenance programs, and United States
weapons development. 199
The Labor Department is still wrestling with the difficulties im-
plicated by the 1976 amendment's inclusion of high technology auto-
mated data processing employees and other computer services
employees. Since the enactment of the 1976 amendments there has
been considerable debate over the possibility of a permanent exemp-
tion of these employees from the Act as well as a continuing general
debate on the question of what exactly constitutes a contract "the
principal purpose of which is to furnish services. ' '2° ° Both matters are
confronted in the new Labor Department regulations.
D. Inconsistent Agency Compliance and Enforcement
The history of inconsistent federal agency compliance is an im-
portant factor in evaluating the efficacy of the Act. In a 1973 review
of compliance by the Defense and Labor Departments, the Comptrol-
ler General found that defense offices, in particular, were failing to
ask for wage determinations or to include them in many of their serv-
ice contracts. 20 1 In many cases, procurement personnel were not
aware of the Act's requirements and their procurement activities were
not monitored for compliance by the Department of Labor.20 2 Fur-
thermore, without an effective system for monitoring compliance, the
Labor Department had no idea whether or to what extent contractors
198. Id. at 67-73. Application of the Act could cause a loss of the flexibility in
staff assignment practices which promotes career development and maximizes the
utility of each field service technician. Id
199. Id at 4, 90-91. As of September 1979, the United States government pos-
sessed over 14,000 computers, 10,551 of which were in use. Id. at 4. Approximately
half of those in use were in the Defense Department. Id The F- 15 and F- 16 fighters
and B-i bomber testing and research programs could be shut down altogether and
nuclear weapons development hampered if there were interference with the opera-
tion of certain computers. Id at 90-91.
200. Service Contract Act of 1965, § 2(a) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§ 351(a) (1976)).
201. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH LA-
BOR STANDARDS FOR SERVICE CONTRACTS BY DEFENSE AND LABOR DEPARTMENTS
6-7 (1978) (hereinafter cited as REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE).
202. Id. at 12. Procurement officials were not aware that the Act applied to
contracts valued at less than $10,000. Id In addition, though the manuals and
guidelines provided to officials were considered adequate, the officials received no
formal training regarding implementation of the Service Contract Act. Id at 13-14.
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themselves might be violating the law.20 3
According to Labor Department regulations, federal contracting
agencies must file a "Notice of Intention to Make a Service Contract"
at least thirty days before inviting bids on a "service contract" ex-
ceeding $2,500.204 Obviously, this requirement leaves to the agency
itself the initial determination of whether the procuring agency is
dealing with a service contract. In nearly one-half of the service con-
tracts reviewed for the 1978 compliance study, the Department of De-
fense failed to request wage determinations as required.20 5 In some
cases where the Defense Department did request wage determina-
tions, the request was untimely. 206
The study indicated that enforcement by the Labor Department
was limited solely to the investigation of complaints, and that the De-
partment itself initiated few reviews. 20 7 In response, the Labor De-
partment complained of a lack of adequate resources to conduct
department-initiated reviews.208  One California official stated,
"There are an estimated 1,000 [Service Contract Act] contractors in
our area. It is estimated that 80 per cent of them are in violation. We
can only get to those in which we recieve a complaint. '20 9
With respect to the imposition of penalties, 210 the compliance re-
203. Id at 18.
One consequence of a lack of a wage determination may be to absolve the em-
ployer of liability for underpayments even where the wages paid are lower than the
prevailing local rates. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Hodgson, 515 F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Hodgson, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that a labor union could not recover damages on behalf of
its members from a government contractor for insufficient wages where neither the
contracting agency nor the Labor Department had made a wage determination. Id
at 379. Specifically the court noted that "[w]hile the Act does provide for enforce-
ment of wage determinations by the Government against offending employers, in-
cluding the recovery of amounts of underpayment and contract cancellation, the Act
does not provide any remedy against employers for the alleged omissions of the Secre-
tary of Labor." Id
204. See 29 C.F.R. § 4.4 (1983). This notice is commonly referred to as "Stan-
dard Form (SF) 98."
205. REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 207, at 9. This report reviewed 425
service contracts, and found that in 205 of these agreements, the wage determinations
were not requested.
206. Id. The Armed Service Procurement Regulations require a procurement
official to provide a detailed explanation for wage determination requests which are
submitted late. Id.
207. Id at 19.
208. Id at 20. In both 1975 and 1976, the Employment Standards Administra-
tion estimated that 25,000 contracts were covered by the Act, but that the Labor
Department was only capable of allocating 15 compliance officer staff years to en-
forcement. Id.
209. Id. The official was not identified.
210. For a discussion of sanctions under the Service Contract Act, see notes 105-
16 supra.
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view found enforcement of the Act's requirements erratic. 21' At one
office, the study noted, the agency director was without knowledge of
the conditions requiring preclusion from participation in federal con-
tracts, while another stated that the policy was simply not followed in
his office. 212
Four years later, the General Accounting Office again undertook
to study agency compliance with the Act. 213 The GAO studied
twenty-two federal installations and determined that procurement of-
ficials at twenty of them failed to request wage determinations from
the Labor Department or to include current wage determinations in
fully one-third of nearly a thousand procurements which were in fact
subject to the Service Contract Act.2 14 The 1982 report was, how-
ever, careful to note that the GAO had found no evidence to suggest
that federal agencies were acting with intent to circumvent the stat-
ute.21 5 Rather, the GAO contended that noncompliance resulted
from a lack of understanding of "the varying interpretations devel-
oped by [the Department of] Labor since the regulations were first
issued in 1968. ''216 Additionally, the GAO noted that there was "mis-
interpretation and misunderstanding of the Act's coverage in the cur-
rent regulations and of other prevailing wage and procurement
laws." 217
Thus, while the failure to comply continues, the reasons for non-
compliance appear to have changed. In 1978, agency noncompliance
was based largely on broad-scale ignorance of the Act. By 1982, pro-
curement officers seemed to know of the existence of the statute, but
could not understand, interpret, or apply it and its murky regulations
211. REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 201, at 22. In a study of seven area
offices, the review identified four contractors in two area offices who violated the Act
and should have been referred to the regional office for debarment consideration. Id
212. Id The latter official said he would only recommend for debarment cases
involving intentional violations. Id.
213. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE SERVICE CONTRACT AcT (1982) [hereinafter cited as As-
SESSMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE.]
214. Id at 7. The concerns raised by the 1982 compliance assessment are reiter-
ated in the 1983 GAO recommendation for repeal of the Act. See COMPTROLLER
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 57-58. For a discussion of the 1983 GAO re-
port and its findings, see notes 146-74 and accompanying text supra. The 1983 report
particularly noted inherent problems in administration, general inflationary effects of
wage rates and fringe benefits under the Act; and government inability, using ex-
isting data sources, to make accurate determinations of prevailing wage rates and
fringe benefits. Daily Labor Report (BNA), Feb. 7, 1983, at D-1.
215. ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE, supra note 213, at 17.
216. Id.; REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 207, at 12.
217. ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE, supra note 213, at 17.
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in light of other prevailing wage and procurement laws, and in light
of federal policy.
The GAO report placed the burden for agency noncompliance
not upon any inefficiencies in agency procedures, but rather upon the
Labor Department itself. Principally, the GAO found that most cases
of agency failure to subject contracts to the requirements of the Act
resulted from an over-inclusiveness of Labor Department regulations
and, thus, were excusable. 2 18 For example, the Labor Department
has consistently asserted that there is no "emergency services" exemp-
tion under the Act. 21 9 The GAO excused the failure to comply with
the statute on fifty-four federal contracts where the delay required to
obtain a wage determination would have seriously impaired govern-
ment operations. 220
After publishing the 1978 and 1982 studies detailing massive ad-
ministrative difficulties with the enforcement of the Act, the GAO's
only recommendation has been to repeal, rather than once again at-
tempt to solve enforcement inadequacies through another
amendment. 221
V. REVISED LABOR DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS
In October 1983, the Labor Department promulgated revised
Service Contract Act regulations. 222 These regulations reflect drastic
revisions by the Reagan administration of proposed changes left
pending at the close of the Carter administration. 223 The regulations,
218. Id
219. Id. The Labor Department maintains that emergency contracts may be
awarded with a provision that the wage determination has been requested and will
be incorporated by modification of the contract upon receipt. Id at 18. In such a
situation, the Labor Department claims it is capable of fulfilling requests for wage
determinations on a priority basis in less than five days. Id
220. d. at 8. The government operations involved included the following:
fighting floods in California, cleaning oil spills off the west coast, and providing medi-
cal support equipment in Veterans Administration medical centers. Id
221. See CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER, supra note 8, at 57-58.
Another recent attempt to improve the administration of the Act is the Labor
Department's establishment of the Board of Service Contract Appeals. See 49 Fed.
Reg. 10,636-10,640 (1984) (rule final March 21, 1984; to be codified at 29 CFR
§§ 8.0-8.19). The new board will hear disputes involving wage determinations and
enforcement proceedings, including debarment in appeals from the Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Division and from decisions of administrative law judges. Id. at
10,638.
222. Labor Standards for Federal Service Contracts, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,736 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Labor Standards].
223. The revised regulations were originally proposed in January 1981, and
were to be effective in August 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4320, 4886 (1981). Implemen-
tation of the proposed regulations was delayed and a revised set of regulations was
published in August 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,380 (1981). Interested persons were
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now final and upheld by District Judge Gasch in February 1984,224
make six major changes in current procedure under the Act. These
changes are designed primarily to streamline the administrative pro-
cess, though they are still subject to a variety of criticisms.
First, the regulations initiate a two-step wage determination for
contracts for which the place of performance is not known at the time
bids are solicited.2 25 Under this procedure, the contracting agency is
to solicit bids without a wage determination and later issue wage de-
terminations for the identified bidders. 226 The winning bidder, how-
ever, will be obligated to comply with the determination for the place
of performance identified in his initial "step-one" bid regardless
of any later move to an area subject to a different wage
determination.2 27
While this two-step approach appears to accept a "place of per-
formance" standard of locality, it still does not resolve the pragmatic
question of the scope of the locality. 228 Moreover, it does nothing to
resolve the artificiality of certain ramificiations of the successor
requirement. 229
Second, the revised regulations redefine the scope of the Act's
coverage by specifying the purpose of covered contracts and the type
of employee who will perform the work. Previously, the Labor De-
partment considered subjected to the Act separate line items or speci-
fications for services, even where the whole contract was not
invited to submit comments. The comment period on the proposed regulations was
open until October 13, 1981. Id. It was subsequently extended to December 1, 1981.
Id at 50,397. On October 20, 1981, notice of a public hearing scheduled for Merritt
Island, Florida, on November 19 and 20, 1981, was given. Id. at 51,405.
Approximately 1,600 interested persons submitted comments, after which the
regulations were again revised and published in final form. See Labor Standards,
supra note 228, at 49,736.
224. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, No. 83-3608 (D.D.C. 1984). The AFL-CIO sought
a declaration that the regulations were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
and otherwise not in accordance with the [Service Contract Act]." Id The district
court upheld the regulations in the face of eight specific challenges. Id Although the
regulations were expected to be implemented following this decision, the AFL-CIO
has filed an appeal with the D.C. Circuit Court seeking to overturn Judge Gasch's
order. See note 9 supra.
225. Id. at 49,764-66 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 4.3, 4.4, 4.53).
226. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.4(a)(2)(i)).
227. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.4(a)(2)(i)).
228. Id at 49,773 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.53). There is "no precise
single formula" by which to define "locality" in every case. Id. It may mean a
"county or cluster of counties comprising a metropolitan area." Id. It may also be "a
city, a state, or under rare circumstances, a region." Id Locality may even be na-
tionwide. Id
229. For a discussion of the successor requirements, see notes 87-104 and accom-
panying text supra.
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principally for the provision of services.230 The new regulation re-
quires that the provision of services be not merely a principal purpose
of the contract, but rather the principal purpose. 23' This change ex-
empts from the Act's coverage the incidental service components of
contracts involving the purchase or lease of computer and high tech-
nology equipment by the federal government. 232
The second aspect of the revised definition of contracts subject to
the Act is an exemption for contracts for services which are not per-
formed principally by "service employees. '2 33 Previously, where serv-
ice employees performed more than a minor part of the contract, the
contract was deemed to come within the coverage of the Act. The
new regulations restrict the application of the Act by providing that
service workers must contribute a ma'orito of the performance of the
contract.
234
Third, the regulations attempt to clarify ambiguities in the cov-
erage by the Act of contracts for repair and maintenance of govern-
ment equipment. 235 In somewhat conclusory fashion, the guidelines
state that contracts for the remanufacture of equipment are excluded
from the Service Contract Act and that contracts for repair are in-
cluded. 236 While the provisions do provide some examples of such
230. Labor Standards, supra note 222, at 49,742 (commentary to revised
regulations).
231. Id. at 49,777, 49,783-84 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 4.110-4.111) (if serv-
ices are "only incidental to the performance of a contract for another purpose, the
Act does not apply").
232. See 1981 Oversight Hearings, supra note 6, at 675 (statement of Eben S. Tis-
dale, Acting Director of Public Affairs, Scientific Apparatus Makers Association)
(where "principal purpose" of contract is to supply product, not perform service,
SCA should not apply). See also Labor Standards, supra note 222, at 49,742-743 (com-
mentary on revised rules).
233. Labor Standards, supra note 222, at 49,777-78 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§§4.110, 4.113).
234. Id. at 49,776 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.113(a)(3)). In close cases, or
where one cannot predict whether service employees will contribute the majority of
time for performance, other factors must be considered. Id. Those factors include
"the nature of the contract work, the type of work performed by service employees,
how integral the work performed by the service employees is to the contract and the
total number of service employees to be employed on the contract." Id.
235. Id at 49,780 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.117). The purpose of this
revision is to eliminate the previous overlap in coverage of the Service Contract Act
and the Walsh-Healey Act. Id
236. Id (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.117(b)(1)(3)). Remanufacture includes
the "major overhaul of an item, piece of equipment, or material which is degraded or
inoperable" or the "major modification of an item, piece of equipment, or material
which is wholly or partially obsolete." Id. (to be codifed at 29 C.F.R. § 4.117(b)(1)-
(2)). "Remanufacturing does not include the repair of damaged or broken equip-
ment which does not require a complete teardown, overhaul and rebuild." Id. (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.117(b)(3)).
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contracts, 23 7 they do not offer any particular assistance in distinguish-
ing between remanufacture and repair.
Fourth, the Labor Department exempts by regulation contracts
for the repair and maintenance of automated data processing equip-
ment.238 Such equipment would include office information systems,
related scientific and medical equipment, and office and business
machines.2 39
Fifth, the successorship provisions of the Act will be applied only
to situations where the successor will perform the contract in the same
locality as the predecessor. 24° While this proposal would apparently
eliminate the problem of "imported" wages in the successor contract
context, it will not resolve all the problems inherent in the successor-
ship provisions. Moreover, it again leaves open the question of the
proper scope of the term "locality."
These provisions represent the first major attempt to revise pro-
cedures under the Act since 1965. The purpose here is not to evaluate
the full impact of the new rules, 24 ' but to point out the new regula-
tion's radical changes in the interpretation and application of the Act.
While many of these changes may be positive, it is questionable
whether they comport with the mandates of Congress. For example,
there is little indication that Congress intended for the total exclusion
of high technology service contracts from the Act. 242 Moreover, the
limitations imposed by the Labor Department on the application of
the successorship provisions have little support in the language of the
Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Service Contract Act, which may have had a commendable
purpose, does not adequately express its own intent. In the years
since its adoption, it has been used to bring under federal wage-set-
ting requirements workers who do not need, and industries which do
not require, the Act's regulation. It has raised legal issues of statutory
237. Id (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.117(b)(3)(i)-(v)). For example, repair of
vehicles, typewriters, office equipment, appliances, and furniture and replacement of
or work on internal parts of equipment are all subject to the Act. Id (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 4.117(b)(3)(i)-(v)).
238. Id at 49,781-82 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.123(e)(i)).
239. Id at 41,403-04 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.123(e)(1)(i)(A)-(C)).
240. Id at 49,789-90 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 4.163(i)).
241. For a discussion of the impact of these proposed regulations, see 1981 Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 6, at 783-877 (Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis on
Proposed Service Contract Act Regulations).
242. For a discussion of the debate over the application of the Act to the high
technology industry, see notes 189-200 and accompanying text supra.
1983-84]
41
Burns: The Service Contract Act of 1965: Time to Revise or Repeal
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
interpretation which cannot be adequately answered by the courts. It
suffers from practical administrative difficulties including inadequate
agency compliance and erratic Labor Department enforcement.
The latest attempt to shore up the Act-the revised Labor De-
partment regulations-raises as many difficulties as it alleviates. The
regulations seek by administrative process to fix once again a statute
which has seen two significant amendments since its inception and
still does not work. They fail to clearly address some issues, such as
locality, which have presented the most persistent legal and practical
problems. Further, in those areas where the regulations arguably
have clarified confused areas, the Department of Labor may well
have exceeded its legislative mandate.
The difficulties with this statute are significant enough that the
resolution must come from the source of the burden: the Congress.
The Act-a "cure where there is no disease"-must either be re-
pealed, as suggested most recently by the General Accounting Office
and the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, or it must
be completely overhauled to deal with the multitude of problems it
has created. No matter which alternative is selected, the time has
come for congressional action.
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